Showing posts with label insurance economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label insurance economics. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 6, 2013

In the Death Spiral We Trust

Copyright, The New York Times Company

The insurance-market death spiral makes sense in theory, but economists do not really know if, and how often, it is a practical consideration in real-world health insurance markets.

Adverse selection refers to a failure of buyers and sellers to transact because one or the other has additional information about the quality or cost of the product to be traded. A classic example from the 2001 Nobel laureate George Akerlof is the market for quality used automobiles, which in theory cannot exist, because buyers of used cars demand a heavy discount because of the likelihood that a used car they might buy will be defective. In theory, nobody sells a quality used car, because it would have to be priced like a lemon.

The used car market is, in theory, caught in a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy in which only defective cars are traded in the marketplace and are priced accordingly.

The same phenomenon has been used to describe the health insurance market. In theory, absent government intervention, only sick people will buy health insurance, which means that insurers have to charge a lot for the insurance, which means that healthy customers will not buy insurance. This is the supposed “death spiral” for health insurance markets.

The solution to this purported problem is to force everyone – especially the healthy – to buy health insurance. That starts a domino effect of other problems, including the unfortunate side effects of the redistribution, such as discouraging employers from creating and employees from accepting full-time jobs, which authors of the Affordable Care Act found to be necessary in order for everyone to be able to comply with the mandate to buy insurance.

I agree with the 2001 Nobel committee, which explained that the adverse selection idea is “a simple but profound and universal idea, with numerous implications and widespread applications.” Still, we don’t really know if the side effects of proposed market interventions are more tolerable than the disease itself.

The used automobile market is a good example. A prudent car buyer should be aware that defective cars are out there.

Nonetheless, the market for used cars did not experience a death spiral and today is active and vibrant. Without any government mandate that the owners of quality used cars sell them, the marketplace has devised a number of practices, such as cars leased from the manufacturer, manufacturer warranties and fleet resales, that help buyers expect quality used cars and thereby prevent the death spiral.

Economic theory predicts that all consumers buy actuarially fair insurance – that is, insurance in which each buyer expects to receive as much as he pays – so the mere fact that many people do not have health insurance (especially healthy people, who do not buy because it is too expensive) would seem to prove that the health insurance market is failing.

But the fact is that health insurance companies, like just about any business, have significant capital and labor overhead costs. Insurance premium revenue is needed to pay those costs. Under such conditions, the average consumer must expect to receive less than he pays. Many healthy people may thereby be uninsured for a good reason: the overhead costs are too much to justify whatever feeling of safety that insurance might give them.

The market might be selecting participants in a productive way. Forcing the insured to buy insurance may be a waste of society’s resources by adding to the already significant overhead costs.

Without proof that adverse selection outweighs other kinds of selection in health insurance, the death spiral may not be a serious threat, and government actions to prevent it may be unnecessary.

Wednesday, January 16, 2013

Tax Exclusions for Health Insurance: Let Me Count the Ways

Copyright, The New York Times Company

The magnitude and distributional effects of the tax exclusion for health insurance look quite different when viewed from the perspective of the entire safety net.

Expenditures on health services, especially those made through employer-sponsored health-insurance plans, are largely excluded from a host of taxes. The tax exclusions affect both the size of the health-services sector and society’s distribution of disposable income.

By excluding health services from tax, governments in effect redirect money toward health care and away from other activities that might be subsidized or prevent government from reducing overall tax rates, or both. The tax exclusions therefore have a lot in common with direct government spending on health, and for this reason are often described as “tax expenditures.”

A typical approach to estimating the size of the health subsidy implicit in the tax exclusions is to estimate the amount of federal personal income tax revenue that is lost because of the income that escapes tax. It’s important to know the amount of the implicit subsidy, because it is directly related to the amount by which the health sector is enlarged by public policy.

However, the income-tax approach underestimates the amount of the exclusion, because health services are often excluded from many other taxes. The payroll tax is an important instance: employer-provided health-insurance premiums are exempt from payroll and state personal income taxes, too, regardless of whether the employer or employee pays them.

Health-insurance premiums paid by employers on behalf of their employees will escape pretty much anything that taxes an employee’s wages and salaries, because those premiums are not officially considered part of employee wages or salaries. For example, the food-stamp program and Section 8 housing subsidy programs implicitly tax wages and salaries by withholding benefits according to how much a person earns, but for that purpose they ignore employee fringe benefits like health insurance.

Health goods and services often escape state sales taxes, depending on the type of good or service delivered or the type of organization delivering it. Many health services are delivered by nonprofit institutions that escape corporate income and property taxes, too. Just as with the housing industry, we vastly underestimate the government’s effect on the health industry if we focus only on the income tax.

A good summary statistic for the overall effect of tax exclusions on the health industry would be a measure of the marginal tax rate on earned income that included all the relevant taxes. When an employee accepts a $1 pay cut so that his employer can add that dollar to his health insurance contribution, that overall marginal tax rate would tell us how much of that dollar comes back to the employee in the form of the various tax reductions.

I am not aware of a marginal tax-rate measure comprehensive enough for this purpose (it would also need to pay special attention to the Medicaid program and its different treatment of adults and children), but previous studies have taken some useful steps in this direction. The studies find marginal tax rates greater than 50 percent for families above but near the poverty line, which means most of the money they might devote to employer-provided health insurance would come back to them in terms of reduced taxes and enhanced benefits.

More study is needed to quantify accurately the government’s effect on the health market. But we can be sure that public policy has served to enlarge the health industry at the expense of others and that previous estimates do not fully appreciate the magnitude of the distortion.

Tuesday, December 18, 2012

The Future of Employer Insurance Coverage II: Margins of Response

Beginning in 2014, essentially everyone without insurance coverage from an employer (or the employer of a family member) will be eligible for significant subsidies for health insurance expenditures, at least if their family income is below 400% of the poverty line (a growing majority of America fits in that category). These ACA subsidies are so large that most of the time they outweigh the penalties employers will pay for not providing coverage.

As compared to 2013, there will be less demand for employer health insurance coverage in 2014 because other means of health insurance coverage are getting subsidized. Naturally, this should reduce the share of employers who offer coverage and reduce the number of people receiving coverage through an employer.

A number of economists are predicted this. However, I am afraid that they are under-estimating the margins on which the labor market can respond (sound familiar?) and thereby under-estimating the negative impact of the ACA on the fraction of people receiving health insurance coverage from an employer.

As far as I can tell, the prevailing approach to quantifying the effect is to look at econometric studies measuring the effect of health insurance costs (usually costs associated with income tax exclusion rules) on the likelihood of an employer's offering coverage. This CBO report discusses its own estimates and the estimates of others; the debate seems to be about which of the econometric estimates to use.

To see why this approach would, barring another offsetting mistake, lead to an underestimate, suppose the employer insurance offerings were completely insensitive to costs.  In other words, we are assuming for the moment that employers continue to offer or not offer insurance in 2014 as they did in 2013.  Still, the ACA would reduce the number of people getting health insurance coverage through an employer.

First, the ACA significantly raises marginal tax rates (the CBO was the first to notice this, see their most recent discussion). That will cause fewer people to work for any type of employer (with or without coverage). (To the extent this is a significant factor pushing employer coverage rates below forecast, you can expect that the forecasters will blame their miss "on the bad economy" but the bad economy itself would be the result of the ACA).

Second, the ACA will make firms offering insurance to their employees less competitive (in the markets in which they sell their output) with other firms, because the subsidies go only to the latter firms. In other words, some of those subsidies will be passed on to consumers and investors, who adjust their spending patterns away from the items made by the former firms and toward the items made by the latter.

Third, the ACA will change factor market comparative advantage (I have been learning about this as part of a project with Chicago grad student Trevor Gallen). Even if the total amount of workers at employers with and without coverage were constant and there were no change in the allocation of production between the two types of firms, employers without coverage would, in effect, give up some of their skilled workers in order to get unskilled workers. These two types of workers are not traded one-for-one because, by definition, a skilled worker is more productive than an unskilled worker. In other words, comparative advantage by itself says that employers without coverage will get more workers but of lesser average "quality" while employers offering coverage will get fewer workers but of greater than average quality.

By my count, there are a total of four margins by which, in response to the ACA, the labor market would reduce the fraction of people receiving health insurance through an employer.  As far as I can tell, the literature about the ACA and insurance coverage has so far considered only one.

(This doesn't mean that a shift away from employer coverage is a bad thing. But I don't see how we can get the welfare economics right without considering more than one of four the major economic incentives. In this regard, the Massachusetts experience is particularly interesting.)



Wednesday, March 24, 2010

Auto Accidents and the Recession

Has anyone seen time series data on automobile accident claims?

Many auto insurance contracts have a specified value (e.g., blue book value) for auto accident awards, and that specified value may not immediately adjust to market conditions. Thus, IF it were true that used car prices fell during the recession, this would reduce the cost to an insured driver of having an accident that "totaled" his auto, which could increase the frequency of accidents that resulted in totaled cars.

Suppose, for example, your car is insured for $5k. Before the recession, a total accident would cost you $1k plus medical bills and hassle because purchasing a similar car would cost you $6k minus the $5k insurance award. During the recession, you could replace your car for $4.5k, so a total accident during the recession would give you a profit of $500, minus medical bills and hassle. So the recession made accidents cheaper (but not necessarily free).

This does not even count the fact that you might not be working during the recession, and have less of a need for your car, or might like to replace your car with one cheaper to operate. One may also want to adjust for the fact that less driving occurs during recessions: the question is whether the driving-adjusted accident rate is higher during a recession.

I have not seen any data on this, but it's something interesting for an economist to investigate.