Economic research over the last couple of decades rejects this belief. It has shown that the financial and non-financial sectors experience quite independent changes, especially over the short and medium term. Take for example the promised yield on the best commercial paper. Fluctuations in this yield are critically important to persons in the financial sector (such as money market traders), but have hardly anything to do with activity outside of that sector. Since World War II, the correlation between the inflation-adjusted commercial paper yield and subsequent inflation-adjusted growth of GDP per capita is zero. That is, GDP growth has been high following high yields just as often as it has been low. It is equally hard to detect a correlation between stock returns, long term bond returns, or commodity returns and subsequent GDP growth. Quite simply, history has shown that the non-financial sector can do well when the financial sector does poorly, and vice versa.
In order to find good predictors of non-financial sector performance, and GDP growth generally, we look to the non-financial sector itself. One of those predictors is the profitability of non-financial capital, or the “marginal product of capital” as we economists call it. The marginal product of capital after-tax is a measure of how much profit (revenue net of variable costs and taxes) that each unit of capital is producing during, say, the last year. When the marginal product of capital after-tax is above average, subsequent rates of economic growth (and subsequent marginal products of capital) also tend to be above average.
Since World War II, the marginal product of capital after-tax averaged between 7 and 8 percent per year. During 2007 and the first half of 2008 – exactly the time when financial markets had been spooked by oil price spikes and housing price crashes – the marginal product had been over 10 percent per year: far above the historical average. Compare this to the marginal product of capital in 1930-33 (the years of Depression-era bank panics): 0.5 percentage points per year less than the postwar years and significantly less than in 1929. The marginal product of capital was also below average prior to the 1982 recession (in this case, far below average) and prior to the 2001 recession. Thus, the surprise was not that GDP continued to grow 2007-8 despite the bleak outlook from Wall Street’s corner of the world, but that GDP growth failed to be significantly above the average. More important from today’s perspective is that much capital in America continues to be productive, and that this will likely permit Americans to advance their living standards as they have in years past. The non-financial sector today looks nothing like it did in 1930.
The weak correlation between asset prices and non-financial sector performance and the strong profitability of today’s non-financial capital are two good reasons to scoff at the idea that the non-financial sector will collapse because of the recent events on Wall Street, and even better reasons to scoff at the Bernanke-Paulson-Bush idea that a massive bailout of financial firms is the key to avoiding a non-financial collapse. Wall Street’s woes are and will be largely limited to Wall Street. The Bush administration should not use the power of the IRS to force the rest of us to board Wall Street’s sinking ship.
Of course, six percent of the workforce is bigger than zero, so a Wall Street mess has indirect effects on the non-financial sector as it absorbs former Wall Street employees and finds alternatives to the financial services Wall Street once provided. But, as long as the government does not get in the way, the marketplace will quickly react to provide the non-financial sector with financial services, even if the main players in that marketplace are no longer named Lehman, Merrill, or Goldman. There are two basic obstacles that Washington might create in this process, both of which are included in the Bernanke-Paulson-Bush proposal. One is to pile on regulation and further impede entry by new firms that might provide financial services to the non-financial sector in the years ahead. The second is to impose a heavy tax burden on the non-financial sector to pay for Wall Street subsidies. The Treasury and the Fed should let Wall Street drown alone, to be replaced by new financial service providers who can swim as robustly as are non-financial American businesses.

8 comments:
Why do I think that calm voices of reason such as yours are going to be ignored? The people seem to be mental sheep nowadays, panicking at the slightest sign of trouble. The irony is that their own panic will make them unleash the tax burden on themselves precisely to support irresponsible lenders.
aa: Are people panicking of their own volition or is the media hype causing the average (economically illiterate) person to perceive this crisis as worse than it is? Did cries around the failing of Lehman and AIG prime the panic pump so that when WaMu fell the public was ready to see the sky falling with it?
I am in agreement with Casey - let them pay the consequences of their risky maneuvers. Any short-term stability gained by this ill-advised bailout will be harmful in the long run.
"marginal product of capital"
Is there an MPK for housing? Part of the problem was a mis-allocation of capital into areas that have less productive future cash flows, such as residential real estate. This shows up in the statistics of employment and GDP being unusually dependent upon residential real estate in the past 5 years.
It's worth asking how MPK from non-financials may have a lag that hasn't yet materialized (i.e. has MPK been temporarily increased).
Casey,
How is MPC measured? Is this statistic readily available? As I remember, we have had a string of companies reporting losses recently not increasing profits...
Rebecca,
I hardly think it is logical to blame the media for "hype" when the (respected economist) head of the federal reserve is leading the charge. Maybe Bernanke is guilty of hype, it is crazy to blame the media.
I have an undergraduate degree in economics and a law degree so I consider myself fairly sophisticated in economics. Still, I am stumped about this one. Economists who I respect have expressed viewpoints that range from "we are facing a major depression if the bail out is not passed" to "we are facing economic turbulence, but nothing more."
I am hearing that the credit markets are beginning to freeze and that commercial paper is drying up. Many companies I am told will soon begin to have problems making payroll or purchasing inventory.
On the other hand, I am also hearing that the problem is confined to Wall Street and the local and regional banks are thriving and will be able to pick up the slack. I am hearing that Federal Rerserve data on credit looks o.k.
People are panicking because the Treasury Secretary and Chairman of the Fed are saying that they should be. If their were an upside for Republicans in promoting panic, I might be willing to attribute the dire warnings to politics From what I can see, however, this is all bad for the Republicans.
I am certainly hoping that the calmer voices are correct, but I am certainly confused.
As a layperson, I marvel at the various theories coming from the economic community. It is obvious the complexity of the financial mess is much more than the average citizen can get their heads around.
I've spent much of my non work time of late, trying to get up to speed on the underlying issues. They are complex, but I feel that I've increased my knowledge, and can even speak somewhat intelligently to co-workers, friends, and others about what's going on.
Sadly, it appears that many of our representatives, who we've sent to Washington to do our bidding, could care less about performing due diligence, and are entirely craven to the political winds blowing through the corridors of power.
Wouldn't you think that a Senator, or Congressman would try to read widely on the subject and make an intelligent decision? Oh, I forgot; that's not how they do their job.
First, here is some recent research that appears to challenge Casey's thesis: http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2008/09/30/research-backs-up-wall-streets-tie-to-main-street/ .
Second, Casey ought to address the conventional narrative about the onset of the Depression in the 1930's that appears to have influence Ben Bernanke and informed the Paulson plan, namely: a banking crisis in 1929-30 (i.e., the financial sector) resulted in a contraction of credit to "main street", thereby undermining real economic activity. Is that narrative wrong, or is it inapplicable to the present circumstances, in Casey's view? Please explain.
I think you have misunderstood the existing problem. The main problem is the market for MBS is wiped out and is illiquid. Banks who had bought MBS as a safe investment (since they had AAA rating) not for taking risk, can not sell them because of the illiquidity problem. Banks need liquid assets for fulfilling their short commitments and that is the reason they are in trouble.
So the problem now is one market is not functioning (MBS market) and this bailout plan helps to increase the liquidity of the market before credit crunch ripples hurt non-financial sector.
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